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Abstract: Data Aggregation (DA) is one of the most frequently used techniques in Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) to improve the network lifetime. It involves gathering, consolidating, and routing the 
sensory data collected by sensor nodes. However, research studies have demonstrated that the 
dependability of the DA process affects severely when malicious nodes are present in the network. 
Many security solutions using cryptography and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) have been proposed 
in the literature for smooth conduction of the aggregation process. However, these solutions require 
more energy and processing capacity, which are the main constraints for sensor nodes. To this end, the 
current study presents Trust-Aware Data Aggregation and Intrusion Detection System (TDAGIDS) for 
clustered WSNs. This TDAGIDS has two modules viz., trust management and intrusion detection. 
Each node runs a Trust Management System (TMS) that computes the trust value of neighbor nodes 
by observing their activities. On the other hand, the Base Station (BS) is equipped with IDS that 
collects the trust values of network nodes and runs a statistical test to identify malicious nodes. In this 
way, TMS at the node level and IDS at BS level work in collaboration to detect and isolate the 
malicious nodes from the DA process. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the TDAGIDS 
over baseline T-LEACH (Trusted Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) protocol and recently 
proposed TDAGIOT (Trust based Data Aggregation for Internet of Things) method. 
 
Index terms: Data aggregation, intrusion detection, LEACH protocol, malicious activities, 
reputation ratings, security attacks, trust management, wireless sensor networks.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are gaining prominence in the domestic, 
industrial, and military applications such as smart homes, home automation, Internet of Things 
(IoT),  smart cities, machine-to-machine communication, environmental monitoring, surveillance 
applications, etc [1, 2, 14]. WSNs are made up of a huge number of tiny and low-cost devices (or 
nodes) which are capable of sensing and communication with limited resources in terms of 
memory, processing, and energy. The main objective of nodes in the network is to sense or 
collect the data related to a process or an environment, and report it to a sink node (or Base 
Station) with cooperative routing decisions. Reporting the data from each node directly to the 
Base Station (BS) is not feasible always because of limited transmission range. Further, nodes 
expend more energy in the communication process than any other operation. In order to save 
node's energy and to improve the network lifetime, in network Data Aggregation (DA) is used in 
WSNs. Directed Diffusion (DD) [3], Sensor Protocol for Information via Negotiation (SPIN) [4], 
etc., is the baseline protocols for DA in WSNs. To make DA process energy efficient, 
hierarchical cluster-based routing protocols have been proposed in the literature. Low Energy 
Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [5], Power Efficient Data Gathering in Sensor 
Information Systems (PEGASIS) [6], Hybrid Energy Efficient Data Gathering (HEED) [7], etc 
[8], are examples of such protocols. DA process in these protocols will be carried out in two 
phases: 1) setup phase, and 2) the steady state phase. Cluster Head (CH) election takes place 
during the setup phase. CH then informs a schedule of data transmission to cluster members. 
During steady state phase, nodes transmit the data to their elected cluster heads during the 
allotted time schedule. In turn, CHs aggregate the data received from its members and forward 
the aggregated data to the base station. With this, it can be understood that the DA process will 
be successful when nodes are cooperative while executing protocol operation. However, node 
cooperation cannot be ensured when the WSNs are deployed in a hostile or remote environment. 
It is because adversaries can physically capture and tamper the nodes so that the tampered nodes 
exhibit malevolent behavior and thwart the network operations. 
 
Research studies in the field of WSNs have shown that the dependability of the DA process will 
be seriously affected when the malicious nodes are present in the network. There are several 
methods available for providing security in WSNs. These methods can be classified into two 
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categories: Cryptography based methods and methods using Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
[9-13]. However, each method has its advantages and limitations. Conventional cryptography 
methods are proven the best in identifying external attacks, but they fail to detect internal attacks. 
It is because an adversary can launch security attacks using the keys obtained from compromised 
nodes. On the other hand, IDS serves as the second line of defense to detect malicious activities. 
It is comprised of a set of complex rules to analyze the activities carried out by the nodes in the 
network. Computing such rules and analyzing the results is a tedious task for resource 
constrained sensor nodes. Therefore, to ensure security, several models based on the concept of 
trust have been evolved in the recent years. Trust Management System (TMS) is a soft security 
system, which computes the trust value of nodes based on their behavior in performing intended 
operations. These trust values are used during the decision making of the network operations 
such as data gathering, aggregation, and routing [40]. 
 
To this end, the current study proposes a collaborative Trust-aware Data Aggregation and 
Intrusion Detection System (TDAGIDS) by taking the advantages of TMS at the node level and 
IDS at the BS level. Each node running TMS assesses the behavior of its neighbors by observing 
the network activities such as packet forwarding, maintaining packet integrity, residual energy, 
etc. The proposed TMS is a hybrid model that calculates the Consolidated Trust Value (CTV) 
using direct and indirect trust values. CTVs are used to perform network activities such as cluster 
head selection, data aggregation, and reporting the aggregated data to the BS. Then, BS analyzes 
the received information using IDS to identify malicious information. Intruder information is 
reported by BS back to the network along with the query message. With this information, nodes 
will be cautious to not to elect malicious nodes as CHs during the setup phase. In this way, the 
proposed model identifies and isolates the malicious nodes from the data aggregation process 
using nodes trust information and IDS report received from the BS. With the extensive 
simulations, it was observed that the proposed method is robust in detecting and isolating the 
malicious nodes from the DA process. It is also observed that using the proposed method the 
network performance metric such as packet delivery ratio has greatly improved as compared to 
other trust-aware DA methods. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. Section 
III describes the system model and the adversary model considered for the study. Section IV 
explains the proposed Trust-Aware Data Aggregation and Intrusion Detection System 
(TDAGIDS). Section V presents the performance evaluation of TDAGIDS method using 
simulation study. Finally, section VI concludes the paper with future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Ozdemir et al. [9] presented state-of-the-art work in secure data aggregation in WSNs. These 
methods use conventional cryptography to protect the basic security requirements such as 
authentication, data integrity, and availability. However, these methods are proven efficient in 
securing the WSNs from external attacks such as eavesdropping. So special treatment is required 
to deal with internal attacks such as the black hole and gray hole attacks [39]. In recent years, 
trust management has been used in the literature that evaluates the trust value of a node based on 
the functional behavior in executing the protocol operations. The evaluated trust value is then 
used in the decision-making during routing, data aggregation and intrusion detection [40].  The 
rest of the section presents related work on trust-aware data aggregation and intrusion detection. 
  
Hur et al. [15] proposed a trust management scheme to distinguish benign nodes from malicious 
nodes. Authors were considered a dense network in which nodes are unaware of their location. 
These nodes derive their locations with the help of special nodes called anchor nodes deployed in 
the network. This trust model quantifies the trust value of a node based on three trust metrics 
such as consistency value, sensing the communication value, and battery value. Authors have 
shown that this trust model aggregate the data resiliently in a logical grid network. Atakli et al. 
[16] proposed weighted trust evaluation model to detect malicious nodes in hierarchical WSNs. 
The communication in WSN is considered as a hierarchy in which Base Station (BS) is at the 
root level and Sensor Nodes (SNs) at the leaf level. Some high power nodes act as forwarding 
nodes between leaf nodes and BS. Initially, a weight factor is assigned to each SN. The 
forwarding node assesses the behavior of SNs using the weight factor and SN sensory output. If 
the computed value found appropriate then the weight factor of the corresponding SN will be 
incremented by 1, otherwise, weight factor is decremented by 1. In this way, this trust model 
evaluates the trust value in a hierarchical network.  
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Song et al. [17] proposed trust based LEACH protocol (T-LEACH) for WSNs to improve the 
dependability of data aggregation and network lifetime in the presence of malicious nodes. This 
model utilizes both direct and indirect trust observations to evaluate the trust value. This trust 
value is used to for decision making during cluster head selection and routing. However, it uses 
special messages to report secondary trust values that may increase the communication and 
energy overhead.  Weichao et al. [18] proposed a direct trust model to improve the performance 
of LEACH protocol in the presence of malicious nodes. Based on the evaluated trust value node 
perform cluster head selection and maintain multi-path towards the base station. While doing 
this, cluster heads act as routers to route the packets to the base station. Since, in the underlying 
LEACH protocol, cluster heads use Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) schedule to receive 
the data packets from its members, maintaining multi-path requires tight time synchronization. 
Alzaid et al. [19] proposed reputation based secure data aggregation method for WSNs. It uses 
well-known Beta reputation model to evaluate the trust value [40]. This model also divides the 
network into the hierarchy and nodes at each level of hierarchy evaluate the trust of nodes in the 
lower levels. Deng et al. [20] proposed trust-aware in-network data aggregation method for 
WSNs. Like Alzaid et al. method, it uses Beta reputation model. In this method, data aggregation 
process has two stages: 1) aggregation input collection and 2) inconsistency check. Periodically 
the aggregation input is collected and checks for inconsistent data if any to evaluate the trust 
value of nodes. Stelte et al. [21] presented the problem of finding trustworthy node as multi-
criteria decision-making. It uses Gaussian probability function with Byzantine decision-making. 
This method shows that node behavior is directly related to trust variability. Yang et al. [22] 
proposed dual trust based LEACH protocol that utilizes both trust management and cryptography 
to secure DA process. This is to make LEACH protocol robust by including authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity and trust evaluation. With this model, authors have shown that LEACH 
protocol is resilient against external and internal attacks.  
Rohbanian et al. [24] proposed watchdog LEACH protocol in which some nodes are considered 
as watchdogs to keep track of nodes behavior in the network. Liu et al. [27] proposed a 
reputation-based trust model for secure data aggregation method for Internet of things 
(TDAGIOT). Authors considered residual energy of node, packet forwarding behavior, and 
packet delay as metrics to evaluate the trust value. Further, the recommended trust values are 
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consolidated by extending D-S evidence theory. Geeta et al. [28] proposed direct trust model 
based centralized LEACH (LEACH-C) protocol. Das et al. [29] proposed an algorithm to detect 
malicious nodes using an enhanced LEACH protocol. Since cluster head election is an important 
factor in the DA process, authors modified the CH election process to save the energy and to 
detect the malicious nodes using the evaluated trust value.  Miglani et al. [30] proposed trust 
based trust based energy efficient routing in LEACH protocol. It is a direct trust model uses 
weight factors to the trust metrics to evaluate the trust value. In addition to trust-aware DA 
process, research has focused on false data injection detection by the malicious nodes.  To this 
end, Sun et al. [23] proposed subjective logic based trust model for fault-tolerant DA process. 
Sandhya et al. [25] proposed false data injection method in heterogeneous WSNs. Roy et al. [26] 
proposed synopsis diffusion method to filter out the attacker’s impact on the DA process. 
Despite of the advantages of the existing trust models, they suffer from several limitations such 
as 1) Most of the models cannot detect multiple security attacks, 2) Lightweight reputation 
exchange is required to reduce communication overhead, and 3) Systematic evaluation of direct 
and indirect trust values are required to enhance the network lifetime.  
Trust management has several applications in WSNs. It is used in several other applications in 
addition to the DA process. Once of the predominant application is Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS). An ID is used as a second level of defense against security attacks. Liao et al. [31] and 
Ioannis et al. [32] presented the design guidelines for IDS. Krontiris et al. [33] utilized trust 
based IDS for detecting sinkhole attacks. Mamun et al. [34] proposed IDS for a hierarchical 
network. Bao et al. [35] proposed a trust based IDS by using statistical methods for WSNs. Shen 
et al. [36] utilized node energy as the main parameter to detect the intrusion. Recently, Hidoussi 
et al. [37] proposed centralized IDS that detect intruders based on misuse of the network 
activities by nodes.  Sigh et al. [38] proposed a cluster-based method for detecting intrusion in 
WSNs. IDS requires high computation or processing capabilities and hence they are suitable to 
work at base stations where sufficient resources are available. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ADVERSARY MODEL 
This section describes the system model and the adversary model considered for the study. 
a. System model  
The system model considered for the study is as follows. 
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 A set of 𝑁 homogeneous sensor nodes is randomly deployed in a 𝑀𝑋𝑀 𝑚2 network area. 
 Nodes are static in the network. 
 Network is insecure and the nodes in the networks can be compromised with a certain 
probability.  
 Base Station (BS) is placed at the center of the network. 
 Each node (including BS) in the network has a fixed communication range.  
 Each node can directly communicate with BS.  
 Communication between each node is symmetric.  
 BS sends out a query message periodically to initiate the DA process. 
 Nodes initiate setup phase and the steady state phase after receiving the query message 
from BS.  
 Malicious nodes are expected after some time from the network initialization.  
 Each node makes use of promiscuous mode of the network interface to observe the 
neighboring nodes activities. In this mode, each node can overhear the packets passing 
through its communication range.  
 The process of cluster head election is similar to LEACH [5] protocol.  
 Energy model proposed for LEACH protocol has been considered for energy 
consumption analysis. In this, a node expend energy to transmit a 𝑘-bit data to distance 𝑑 
is given as follows [5] 
𝐸𝑇𝑥(𝑘, 𝑑) = {
𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑒𝑙𝑒 + 𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑠 ∗ 𝑑
2    ,   𝑖𝑓  𝑑 < 𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑒𝑙𝑒 + 𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑚𝑝 ∗ 𝑑
4,       𝑖𝑓  𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
   (1) 
Where, 𝐸𝑒𝑙𝑒 is the energy required to run the transmitter and receiver electronic circuits, 
𝐸𝑎𝑚𝑝  and 𝐸𝑓𝑠  are the unit energy required to run the amplifier circuit. These values 
depend on radio propagation model. 𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  is the cross over distance calculated as 
𝑑𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 = √
𝐸𝑓𝑠
𝐸𝑎𝑚𝑝
. On the other hand, node expend energy to receive a 𝑘-bit data is given 
as 𝐸𝑅𝑥 = 𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑒𝑙𝑒.   
b. Adversary model 
Initially, it is assumed that the nodes in the network are trustworthy. However, malicious nodes 
start appearing after some time from the network initialization. It is assumed that nodes are 
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compromised by an adversary. Such nodes misbehave during DA process by launching 
following attacks [39]. 
 Black-hole attack: A malicious node deliberately drops the packets that it receives. 
 Gray hole attack: A malicious node selectively forwards the packets and drops the 
packets. It also tampers the integrity of the data packet. 
 False data attack: In this attack, a malicious node reports false sensor reading to mislead 
the decision-making process by the base station. 
 False energy attack: A malicious node reports false energy information to become cluster 
head. Once it becomes the cluster head, it drops all the received data packets.  
 Packet delay attack: A malicious node sends the data packet to cluster head other than 
the given time schedule. With this, cluster head considers the data is old and discards it 
from data aggregation. 
 Badmouth attack: A malicious node reports false trust value of a well-behaving node 
with an intention to damage the reputation.  
Each malicious node has an independent attack profile. It means malicious nodes work in non-
colluding fashion. 
 
IV. COLLABORATIVE TRUST AWARE DATA AGGREGATION AND INTRUSION 
DETECTION SYSTEM (TDAGIDS) 
In the proposed method, a node in the network utilizes Trust Management System (TMS) for 
assessing the Consolidated Trust Value (CTV) of its neighboring nodes. BS initiates the DA 
process by periodically broadcasting a query message. Upon receiving the query message, nodes 
initiate the setup phase to elect a Cluster Head (CH) and steady state phase to transmit the data to 
CH in the given time schedule. Among these phases, setup phase has paramount importance 
because malicious nodes should not be elected as CHs. If CH is malicious, then the data packets 
may not reach the BS. To this end, each node runs the proposed TMS and calculates CTV to 
isolate the malicious nodes from setup and steady state phase. With the help of CTV, the step of 
DA process such as CH election, data transmission, aggregation, and routing takes place. CHs 
analyze the data received from their members and report the suspected malicious information to 
the BS. BS then analyzes the trust values received from the network by running a statistical test 
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to identify malicious nodes. Then, BS prepares the list of malicious nodes and broadcasts this list 
to the network along with the query message. In turn, nodes in the network make decisions based 
on the evaluated CTV and information received from the BS.  
 
a. Trust Management System (TMS) at node level 
The objective of the proposed TMS is to calculate the CTV of nodes based on direct and indirect 
observations. With direct observations, TMS calculates Direct Trust (DT) value of nodes. During 
indirect observations, TMS calculates the Indirect Trust (IT) value of nodes with the trust 
recommendations received from neighboring nodes. While doing this, TMS identifies and filters 
the false recommendations to obtain a correct IT value. Finally, DT value and IT value are 
combined with the help of Confidence Factor (CF) value to evaluate CTV. CF value indicates the 
confidence level between two nodes about their behavior. The value of CTV remains in the range 
[0, 1]. Initially, CTV of each node is set to 0.5. It is to show that initially each node is 
trustworthy in the network. A node is said to be benign if it has the CTV above 0.5. Otherwise, 
node is considered as malicious. The rest of the section explains the procedure of calculating DT 
value,IT value, and CTV. 
 Direct Trust (DT) value calculation 
TMS calculates DT value of nodes based on the functional behaviors (or trust metrics) such as 
sincerity in reporting sensory data (𝑚1), sincerity in forwarding the packet (𝑚2), sincerity in 
maintaining packet integrity (𝑚3) , sincerity in timely reporting the data (𝑚4) , sincerity in 
reporting residual energy (𝑚5), and sincerity in reporting recommendation trust (𝑚6). Since the 
CHs will be having control over their cluster member’s activities, the responsibility of observing 
trust metrics has been delegated to CHs and non-CHs separately. CHs observe the trust metrics 
𝑚1  to 𝑚4 , and non CH nodes observe the trust metrics  𝑚2, 𝑚3, 𝑚5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚6 . An interaction 
between two nodes A and B is said to be a success if both A and B have performed correct 
functional behavior. Otherwise, such interaction is said to be a failure. To monitor the success 
and failure interactions, TMS maintains two counters such as 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(. ) and 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(. ) for each 
trust metric. In this, (. ) represents the trust metric. Initially, these two counters are initiated to 0. 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 of corresponding trust metric will be incremented by one for each successful interaction. 
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Otherwise, 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 of the corresponding trust metric will be incremented by one.  TMS observes 
for success and failure of trust metrics as follows 
 Sincerity in reporting sensory data: Each node reports the sensed data to the CH. In turn, 
CH aggregates the data and reports the consolidated data to the BS. BS initiates the action 
if any discrepancy has been identified in the reported data. Therefore, data is an important 
factor to be monitored. To do this, let CH receives the data 𝑑1, 𝑑2, . . , 𝑑𝑚 from its cluster 
members, then the sensory data is said to be a correct if 𝑑𝑖 ∈ |𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔 ± 3 ∗ 𝜎𝑑|, otherwise, 
it is said to be a failure. In this, 𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔 is the mean of the sensory data and 𝜎𝑑 is the sample 
standard deviation of sensory data. With this, false data attack can be identified.   
 Sincerity in forwarding the packet and maintaining packet integrity: The number of data 
packets to be received by a CH is equal to its number of cluster members. However, gray 
hole attackers may drop or tampers the integrity of the packets. Thus, when a node 
forwards the data packet, it overhears the same packet to check for further routing and 
packet integrity. Packet forwarding is said to be a success if it observes the originated 
packet routed successfully without tampering its integrity. With this, gray-hole and black 
hole attacks can be identified. 
 Sincerity in reporting residual energy: Node’s residual energy is an important factor to 
be elected as the cluster head and forward the packets to the BS. Let 𝐸𝑐, 𝑄𝑛, 𝐸𝑡𝑥, 𝐸𝑟𝑥, 𝐸𝑡ℎ 
be the residual energy, query number, energy required for transmitting the packet, and 
energy required for receiving the packet, and energy threshold set by the application 
respectively, the success and failure in reporting correct energy information are identified 
using Eq. (1) as follows 
|𝐸𝑐 − (𝑄𝑛 − 1) ∗ (𝐸𝑡𝑥 + 𝐸𝑟𝑥)| ≤ 𝐸𝑡ℎ                   (1) 
Energy claim is said to be correct or a success if the Eq. (1) is true. Otherwise, it is said to 
be a failure. Eq. (1) is formulated with an institution that a malicious node spends more 
energy by launching the security attacks. Hence, if any malicious node reports high-
energy information than it actually expends, then such false information providers can be 
identified. With this, false energy attack can be identified.  
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 Sincerity in timely reporting the data: CHs broadcast TDMA schedule to their cluster 
members for transmitting the data. Each cluster member has to send its data during the 
given time slot. However, if data has been sent by cluster member with a huge time 
delay, then CH considers such data as not fresh and discards from the aggregation 
process. Hence, delay in packet transmission has to be monitored for calculating trust 
value. Let Δ𝑆𝑡, Δ𝑅𝑡, and 𝑇𝑡ℎ be the schedule time, data receiving time, delay threshold set 
for the application respectively, then success and failure in timely reporting the data is 
identified using Eq. (2) as follows 
|Δ𝑅𝑡 − Δ𝑆𝑡| ≤ 𝑇𝑡ℎ                      (2) 
A node is said to be sincere in timely reporting the data if the Eq. (2) is true. Otherwise, it 
is said to be a failure. With this, packet delay attacks can be identified.  
 Sincerity in reporting recommendation trust values: Badmouth attacks are identified by 
validating the recommended trust values. Hence, filtering and detecting the badmouth 
attackers is discussed in the next section. 
With the above observations, TMS proceeds for DT value calculation. DT value calculation is 
considered as Weighted Sum Method (WSM). In this, DT value of a node A is calculated as the 
sum of the products of weights and expectation values of the trust metrics as follows 
𝐷𝑇(𝐴) = ∑ 𝑊(𝑚𝑖) ∗  𝐸(𝑚𝑖)
4
𝑖=1     (3) 
In Eq. (3) weight of a trust metric is calculated as 
𝑊(𝑚𝑖) =
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑚𝑖)
𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐴)
                                                    (4) 
In Eq. (4), 𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 represents the total success count of node A. It is calculated as sum of success 
count of all the trust metrics as follows  
𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐴) = ∑ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑚𝑖)
4
𝑖=1     (5) 
Expectation of each trust metric is calculated as follows 
𝐸(𝑚𝑖) =
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑚𝑖)+1
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑚𝑖)+𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑚𝑖)+2
    (6) 
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Weight value gives the overall weight of a trust metric over other trust metrics and the 
expectation value is related to specific trust metric of a node.  Since the weight and expectation 
values of the trust metrics are in the range [0, 1], DT value also remains in the range [0, 1]. 
Further, TMS calculates the confidence factor using Eq. (7) as follows 
𝐶𝐹(𝐴) = {
1
𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐴)
       𝑖𝑓  𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐴) > 2
0.5                                       𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
          (7) 
It can be observed that using Eq. (7), CF value of a node increases with respect to increase in the 
number of total successful interactions. With this, TMS proceeds to IT value calculation.   
 Indirect Trust (IT) value calculation 
Nodes send the indirect trust values along with the data packets sent to the CHs. A normal node 
prepare a list of neighboring node identities and their corresponding trust values which are above 
a trust threshold 𝑇𝑅𝑡ℎ  and sends along with the data packets to the CH. These trust values are 
said to be indirect trust values. Nodes observing these values have to filter and aggregate the 
correct trust values to identify and isolate badmouth attackers. The trust threshold 𝑇𝑅𝑡ℎ  is 
calculated using Eq. (8) as follows 
𝑇𝑅𝑡ℎ =
∑ 𝐷𝑇(𝑁𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚
                                      (8) 
Where, 𝑁𝑗 is the neighbor node 𝑗 and 𝑚 is the total number of neighbor nodes. Since energy of a 
node is an important factor to be considered in the DA process, the process of reporting the 
indirect trust values should also be energy efficient. However, calculated DT value is floating 
point value that requires 4-byte memory to store. Therefore, in the proposed method, the DT 
value is rounded to an integer value as follows 
𝐷𝑇𝑅(𝐴) = 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙(𝐷𝑇(𝐴) ∗ 100)        (9) 
Since energy consumption in WSNs depends on the number of bits transmitted or received, using 
Eq. (9) the memory required for DT value can be reduced from 32 bits (i.e., size of floating point 
value) to 7 bits (i.e., 7 bits support numbers from 0 to 128). These values are said to be 
recommended trust values. Since each node works using the promiscuous mode of the network 
interface, they can overhear the recommended trust values and proceed to IT value calculation. 
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The proposed TMS uses well-known Shewhart X-bar control limits [41] to filter the false 
recommendations. This concept has been used in various applications such as manufacturing, 
health monitoring, etc., for quality control.  
Let node X receives recommended trust values 𝐷𝑇𝑁1
𝑅 (𝐵), 𝐷𝑇𝑁2
𝑅 (𝐵), … . , 𝐷𝑇𝑁𝑚
𝑅 (𝐵) about a subject 
node B from its neighbors 𝑁1, 𝑁2, … . , 𝑁𝑚 then X calculates the IT value of B as follows 
Step 1: Calculate the mean and sample standard deviation (𝜎) of recommended trust 
values. This mean value is said to be Control Limit (CL).  
Step 2: Calculate the Upper Control Limit (UCL) and Lower Control Limit (LCL) using 
the CL and 𝜎 as follows  
𝑈𝐶𝐿 = ⌈𝐶𝐿 + 3 ∗
𝜎
√𝑚
⌉                            (10) 
𝐿𝐶𝐿 = ⌊𝐶𝐿 − 3 ∗
𝜎
√𝑚
⌋                             (11) 
Step 3: Discard the recommendations that are not in the range of LCL and UCL. Since 
discarded recommendations are out of bound, we can consider them as initiated by 
badmouth attackers. Further, the fifth trust metric (i.e., sincerity in reporting 
recommendation trust) deals with identification of badmouth attacker, increment 
𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑚5) of nodes that provided out of bound recommendation values. In addition, 
increment 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑚5)  of nodes that provided correct recommendation values. In this 
way, with these three steps, false recommendations will be filtered. With the correct 
recommendation values, TMS proceeds for calculating IT value.  
Step 4: Let 𝑁3, 𝑁4, … . , 𝑁𝑚−1  be the neighboring nodes that provided correct 
recommendations, and then calculate the Opinion Weight Factor (OWF) as follows 
𝑂𝑊𝐹(𝑁𝑘) =
𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑁𝑘)
∑ 𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑁𝑙)
𝑚−1
𝑙=3
                          (12) 
Step 5: Using OWF the IT value is calculated as follows 
𝐼𝑇(𝐵) = ∑ 𝑂𝑊𝐹(𝑁𝑘) ∗ (
𝐷𝑇𝑁𝑘
𝑅 (𝐵)
100
)𝑚−1𝑘=3  (13) 
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The calculated IT value remains in the range [0, 1]. 
An example is provided here to illustrate the above steps. Consider that node X has received 
recommendations from 20 neighbors about one of its neighbor node B as shown in Table 1. In 
this table, ID represents the node identity of recommending node, RT is the recommended trust 
value, and TS is the total success count with corresponding recommending node.  
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
RT 88 45 35 50 44 36 87 32 50 46 38 43 82 39 83 85 41 43 47 44 
TS 4 10 8 12 11 6 4 10 5 6 9 8 2 6 1 4 6 4 7 9 
Table 1: Table showing trust recommendations by 20 nodes 
By following step 1 and step 2, the CL, 𝜎, LCL and UCL are obtained as 52.9, 19.2, 40, and 67 
respectively. It is shown in Figure 1 that how the recommendations are filtered using X-bar 
control limits. From figure, it can be observed that the recommendation values that are in the 
range of LCL and UCL are considered for the IT value calculation. Rest of the recommendations 
is discarded from IT value calculation. With this, the recommendations made by nodes 1, 3, 6, 7, 
8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 are discarded from IT value calculation. In this, nodes 1, 7, 13, 15, 16 have 
provided very high recommendation values. On the other hand, nodes 3, 6, 8, 11, 14 have 
provided very low recommendation values. By applying step 4 and step 5 the IT value of node B 
is obtained as 45.47.   
 
Figure 1: X-bar control limits to filter false recommendations 
There are several methods proposed in the literature for IT value calculation. Using the simple 
average method proposed by Ganeriwal et al. [43] the IT value is obtained as 52.9, using Alzaid 
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et al. [19] method the IT value is obtained as 51 and using Yanbing et al. [27] method the IT 
value is obtained as 42. It means the IT value is changing from method to method. All these 
methods are purely based on the recommended trust value. However, in the proposed trust 
model, the IT value calculation is inspired from human societies. In social environments, 
importance to a person is given based on the social status and/or the number of favorable or 
responsible activities carried out for the society. Trust in a person increases with positive 
experiences and decreases with negative experiences with him. Motivated from it, proposed 
TMS will consolidate the IT values based on the total success held with its neighboring nodes. 
Unlike methods [17, 19, 27, 43], the IT value is calculated by considering total success count of 
the recommending nodes into consideration. It can be observed step 4 and step 5 that the IT 
value of node B is 45.47. This value is more nearest trust value because it is obtained by 
discarding the out of bound recommendations and consolidating the resultant recommendations 
with the total success count of the corresponding recommending nodes.  
 Consolidated Trust Value (CTV) calculation 
CTV is obtained by combining DT and IT values. With the calculated DT and IT values node A 
calculates the CTV of node B as follows 
𝐶𝑇𝑉(𝐵) = 𝐶𝐹(𝐵) ∗ 𝐷𝑇(𝐵) + (1 − 𝐶𝐹(𝐵)) ∗ 𝐼𝑇(𝐵)   (14) 
Since DT, CF and IT values are in the range [0, 1], CTV also remains in the range [0, 1]. 
b. Intrusion Detection System at Base Station 
CHs calculate the CTV of each of their members using Eq. (14). Then, CHs identify and list 
nodes having CTV less than average CTVs of neighbors and report the list along with the 
aggregated data packet to the BS. In addition, BS may also receive the CTVs from the nodes that 
do not fall under any CH. Received CTVs of a node by BS are small amount as compared to the 
CTVs evaluated by nodes in the network. It means that the reported CTVs follow normal 
distribution and the variance of malicious activities is unknown. This problem can be modeled 
using Student’s t-distribution with 𝑣 degrees of freedom [41].  
Let BS receives the CTV of a node A from 𝑚 nodes, and then it calculates the mean 𝐶𝑇𝑉(𝐴)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 
sample standard error 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑟 as follows 
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𝐶𝑇𝑉(𝐴)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
∑𝐶𝑇𝑉𝑗(𝐴)
𝑚
                                         (15) 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑟 =
𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑣
√𝑚
                                                       (16) 
In Eq. (16), 𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑣 is the standard deviation of the sample CTVs that is calculated as   
𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑣 = √
∑ (𝐶𝑇𝑉𝑗(𝐴)−𝐶𝑇𝑉(𝐴)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑚−1
                         (16) 
Using Eq. (15), Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), BS prepares a test statistic to accept any one of the two 
competing hypothesis given as follows 
H0 (null): Node A is benign 
H1 (alternate): Node A is malicious 
The test statistic is defined as follows 
𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
𝜇−𝐶𝑇𝑉(𝐴)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑟
                                             (17) 
The 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡   in Eq. (17) represents the test statistic of the Student’s t-distribution [41]. This 𝑇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 is 
compared with the value obtained from t-table to check whether the sample mean is significantly 
different from the hypothetical mean 𝜇 for user-defined level of significance. The value of 𝜇 is 
considered as 50. If the test concludes that there is no significant difference between sample and 
hypothetical mean then test accepts H0, otherwise test accepts H1. Then, BS prepares a list of 
nodes for which H1 is accepted, and broadcasts the list along with the next query message. In 
this way, TMS at node level and IDS at BS level enable all nodes in the network to be vigilant 
about the malicious nodes while performing DA process.  
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V. SIMULATION STUDY 
a. Simulation setup 
Table 2: Simulation parameters  
Network Simulator ns-2.35 
Number of nodes 100 
Network area 200 x 200 𝑚2 
Node communication range  150 meters 
Simulation time 10000 seconds 
Query interval 5.0 s 
Attack start time 100 s 
Max. malicious nodes 50 
Base station location (100,100) 
Data packet size 512 bytes 
Initial energy of node 0.5 J 
t-test level of significance 0.01 
Query start time 20 s 
𝐸𝑒𝑙𝑒 50 nJ/bit 
𝜖𝑓𝑠 10 pJ/bit/𝑚
2 
𝐸𝑡𝑤𝑜−𝑟𝑎𝑦 0.0013 pJ/bit/𝑚
4 
𝐸𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑡ℎ 0.01 
 
The network simulator ns-2 [42] has been used to evaluate performance of the proposed 
TDAGIDS method. This method has been compared with baseline T-LEACH [17] protocol and 
recently proposed TDAGIOT [27] method. Important simulation parameters considered for the 
simulation study are presented in Table 2.  BS sends out a query message for every 5.0 seconds. 
In this way, during the simulation time BS sends out 2000 queries to collect the data. It is 
assumed that normal sensors sense the temperature and reports the sensory data to CH or BS. 
While doing this, it is assumed that benign sensor nodes report the sensory data in the range 25
0
C 
to 30
0
C. False data attackers report the sensory data in the range 450C to 500C or 50C to 100C. 
Dependability of DA process depends on the packet delivery ratio. It is the ratio of the number of 
packets received by the BS to the number of packets sent by the nodes. In the presence of 
malicious activities, it is measured as number of valid data packets received at the BS. To 
evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, three attack scenarios are considered to 
verify the packet delivery. Packet delivery of the proposed TDAGIDS has been validated in the 
presence of gray hole attacks, false data attacks, and a mixture of all attacks mentioned in the 
Section III (b). The number of malicious nodes is varied from 10 to 50 with a step size of 10.  
Results presented in the next section are the average of the output of 50 runs.   
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b. Results and Discussion  
Figure 2 shows the number of gray hole attackers versus the number of valid data packets 
received at the base station. It is apparent from the figure that the packet delivery ratio is high in 
case of TDAIDS as compared to T-LEACH and TDAGIOT methods. It is because of the trust 
model at node level and IDS at the BS level. The collaborative effort of nodes and BS resulted in 
improvement of the packet delivery ratio in TDAGIDS. 
 
 
Figure 2: Packet delivery in the presence of gray hole attacks 
 
Similar improvement was also observed in the case of presence of data attackers. Figure 3 shows 
the number of data attackers versus the number of valid packets received at the BS. Trust models 
T-LEACH and TDAGIOT have focused on verifying the validity of data packet. However, 
TDAGIDS have considered validating the sensory data in addition to verifying the packet 
validity. It made the TDAGIDS method to detect and isolate data attackers from the DA process. 
Further, false sensory data are discarded from the aggregation process and hence the number of 
valid packets received at BS has increased.  
From Figure 3, it was observed that TDAGIDS is more robust in detecting and isolating 
malicious nodes. In the presence of mixture of malicious activities, TDAGIDS is able to identify 
and isolate the malicious nodes and hence the number of valid packets received at BS is 
increased as compared to T-LEACH and TDAIOT methods.  
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 Figure 3: Packet delivery in the presence of false data attackers 
 
 
Figure 4: Packet delivery in the presence of various attacks 
From Figures 2, 3, and 4, it was observed that the dependability of the DA process was 
significantly improved over existing trust-aware DA methods because of the collaborative efforts 
of TMS at the node level and IDS at the BS level.  
To evaluate the performance of TMS alone, simulations were conducted by disabling the IDS at 
the BS level. Figure 4 shows the percentage improvement in the packet delivery in the presence 
of various malicious activities in the network by using IDS support and without IDS support. It 
was observed from the graph that there is no significant difference when 10 malicious nodes are 
present in the network. It is because TMS is sufficient to identify these malicious nodes. 
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 Figure 5: Performance of TDAGIDS with and without IDS 
However, the importance of IDS comes into force when the number of malicious nodes is 
increasing. It can be seen from Figure 5 that the support of IDS at BS level provided a maximum 
of 16.6% improvement in packet delivery when 40 malicious nodes are present in the network. It 
was also observed that in amidst of more malicious nodes support of IDS at BS level helping in 
best-of-effort delivery of valid packets. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of malicious cluster head election 
The quality of the DA process majorly depends on the CH election. The number of valid packets 
received at the BS will be high if CH is benign. Therefore, trust models need to select only 
benign nodes as CH to report their sensory data. In this context, five nodes with identities 1, 5, 9, 
13 and 17 are considered as gray-hole and conducted the simulation on a network to check how 
many times these nodes are selected as CH by nodes in the network. During the setup phase, if a 
node advertises cluster head advertisement, remaining nodes have the choice to select a node 
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among them as cluster head based on the CTV, remaining energy, and distance to the base 
station. Figure 6 plots the comparison of electing a gray hole node as the cluster head. It was 
observed from the figure that the TDAGIDS method is rejecting the gray hole nodes as CH for 
more than 68% of times as compared to T-LEACH and TDAGIOT methods.  
 
Figure 7: Improvement in rejecting malicious cluster head 
Figure 7 plots the percentage improvement in rejecting malicious cluster head in TDAGIDS in 
comparison with T-LEACH and TDAGIOT methods. It was observed from the figure that in 
TDAGIDS the percentage of times a malicious node is not chosen as CH is improved by a 
maximum of 42% as compared to T-LEACH and 25% as compared to TDAGIOT methods. 
 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of the network lifetime 
Figure 8 plots the comparison of the lifetime of the network when T-LEACH, TDAGIOT, and 
TDAGIDS are employed. It was observed that by the end of 2000 queries almost all nodes are 
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dead in case of T-LEACH protocol. It is because the indirect trust values are disseminated in the 
form of floating point values. In case of TDAIOT, the indirect trust values are rounded to an 
integer value and disseminated and hence the number of dead nodes is decreased as compared to 
T-LEACH protocol. However, in case of TDAGIDS the curve of dead nodes with respect to the 
number of queries is converging slowly. It is because of the support of IDS at the BS level. 
Since, along with the trust value calculation at node level, malicious node detection at BS level 
helps in early detection of malicious nodes and hence only relevant indirect trust values are 
disseminated in the network. With this, the rate of draining the energy has decreased in the 
network. It was observed that on an average 8 to 9 nodes are alive in case of TDAGIOT method 
and 11 to 13 nodes are alive in case TDAGIDS methods by end of 2000 queries.  
From the simulation results, it can be concluded that the collaborative effort of IDS at the BS 
level and TMS at node level improved that the packet delivery ratio and decreased energy 
consumption of nodes significantly as compared to T-LEACH and TDAGIOT methods.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Collaborative Trust-Aware Data Aggregation and Intrusion Detection System (TDAIDS) has 
been proposed in this paper. This TDAGIDS has two modules viz., trust management and 
intrusion detection. Each node runs a Trust Management System (TMS) that computes the trust 
value of neighbor nodes by tracking their activities. This TMS is a hybrid trust model and it 
evaluates the trust value using direct and indirect observations. The proposed TMS has the 
features such as trust metrics observation, trust value calculation, and systematic filtering of false 
recommendations. On the other hand, the Base Station (BS) is equipped with IDS that collects 
the trust values of network nodes and runs a statistical test to identify malicious nodes. In this 
way, TMS at the node level and IDS at BS level work in collaboration to detect and isolate the 
malicious nodes from the DA process. With the simulation results, it was observed that the 
packet delivery and network lifetime have significant improvement when TDAGIDS is 
employed in the network as compared to T-LEACH and TDAGIOT methods. The current work 
focused on DA process in a homogeneous network. As future work, we attempt to address the 
trust-aware data aggregation in heterogeneous networks by considering powerful security attacks 
such as Sybil attack and wormhole attack.  
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